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OPEN DISCUSSION
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Leo [Raskind]. We now have
time for lots of discussion; I would like to give everyone the opportunity
to speak who wants to speak. I suppose we need a few rules to operate
in a normal, civil, rational system.
To help in recording this program, it would help us if you would
give your name and business or law school affiliation when you speak,
and, second, it would help if only one person speaks at once.
So who would like to start off? Maybe I should ask, does anybody
want to volunteer to disagree with Leo [Raskind]? It is always good to
get contrary opinions on the floor.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I guess I failed in the wake-up
function.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Dennis Karjala from Arizona State
University College of Law. I have lots of questions. I found many interesting thoughts and insights in the presentation.
I just wonder, what are you doing about preemption? If we are
going to start protecting all this stuff, how are we going do it?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Gee, I thought you would never ask,
because in my paper I have a draft statute.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I did not see it. I did not get a copy of
it.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I guess I did not get it here timely. I
think the state statute, obviously, is one of the things, and I should
have mentioned it.
I think there will be two ventures. I think there will be some proposals for federal legislation either an extension of 1043A or to use of
Commerce Clause to craft a federal statute expressly to protect
databases. If not, then they will draft a statute, like the one I have
scribbled out, which you will see in the paper, which says something
like this: It shall be unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the state act to duplicate without permission for use or inclusion in
any product distributed in the state by sale, rental, or otherwise, or to
grant access by sale, rental, or otherwise to any part of the information
contained in this directory, database, CD-ROM or whatever other form
or so on and so on.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Is that a state statute?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: That is a proposed, model state
statute.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: That is not preempted?
Published by eCommons, 1991
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PROFESSOR RASKIND: I am not so sure it is preempted. In
other words, Bonito Boats has strong language that would lead you to
that, but if you add to the line of Supreme Court cases of Bonito Boats
the notions that came out of the Berne Convention Act, that we look to
state law to craft up and put together moral rights, it is possible that a
preemption issue from such a statute might be presented to the Supreme Court, and my conclusion under present doctrines would be that
that statute would not survive.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: And would not survive section 301
either?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: It would not survive 301.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Because facts are not copyright subject matter?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Right.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I question that.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: There is a penumbra of uncertainty
there. That is my answer.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Jerry Reichman from Vanderbilt
University. I liked Leo's [Professor Raskind's] talk because it has some
subtle implications for the long term.
First of all, I am surprised at the surprise of the commentators
and the bar about the stricter originality standard of Feist. I have been
saying for years that Batlin v. Synder and its progeny introduced a
quantitative standard of creativity for borderline subject matters from
1976 on. The empirical evidence is overwhelming. However, because
Professor Nimmer did not like this line of cases, he ignored it at first
and downplayed it later on, hence many observers were taken by
surprise.
By 1990, the standard of originality in the Second Circuit as derived from Batlin ranged between Eckes and F.L v. Moody, and the
Feist decision leaves that doctrinal range exactly where it stood. Maybe
one could argue that it is now Eckes plus or minus a tad, or F.I.I. v.
Moody plus two tads, but nothing more than that. I just do not think
there is much of a change there. I do wish the Supreme Court had not
added constitutional underpinnings to this line of cases, but I do not
think that will make any significant difference, either
In contrast, the most important aspect of Feist is its reference to
"thin" copyright protection, this could have a major impact on the application of copyright law to borderline subject matters. Until Feist, we
had only an underground decision beloved by many law professors, the
Kempner-Tragoe case, which stated that "thin protection" of functional works was always an "open secret," and that Baker v. Selden
supplied
the policies and precedent that justified it. In the past, of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
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course, one could respond, "what does that Kempner-Tragoe judge up
there in the Eastern District of Michigan know about it, when all these
high-powered special interests are telling everybody a different and
more protectionist story?"
Meanwhile, factual works had consistently received thin protection
from the Ninth Circuit, by which I mean protection against slavish imitation, but not against nonliteral takings of disparate elements. This
form of protection amounts to a de facto kind of unfair competition
law. And now the Supreme Court has come along and said: "Yes, that
is all the protection that factual works are going to get." If so, then by
implication, Feist raises serious questions about functional works, too,
which have obtained only thin protection since Continental Casualty
reinterpreted Baker v. Selden. As a result, I think we are going to see
some narrowing of the scope of protection for computer programs,
some narrowing of Whelan, for example, as Leo [Raskind] correctly
points out.
I would like to point out that the Nordic countries quite some time
ago adopted a neighboring rights solution for nonoriginal,
noncopyrightable catalogues and directories, which is discussed in my
paper. The Commission of the European-Communities is proposing a
modified versions of the-Nordic "catalogue rule" to cover, electronic
data bases. I think we need to take a look at these approaches before
embarking on a unilateral solution of our own, especially one that relies
on full copyright protection.
MR. CUTLER: I am Norton Cutler with NCR Corporation. You
implied, Professor Raskind, there was something socially good about
bringing back sweat of the brow or investment group protection and I
guess I would go over the facts and I do not understand why you feel
that way.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I am not sure what you are asking me.
Suppose I asked you this question in response: Do you think there
ought to be a rule in the marketplace that anybody could take anyone
else's material and reproduce it in any circumstance?
MR. CUTLER: No copying.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: And so my thought is the courts are
not going to countenance it. The courts are going to be faced with arguments from material otherwise outside the scope of Feist that there
is unfairness, and try misappropriation or other kinds of arguments.
My reaction to that is that rather than go awry, it gets you back to the
INS v. AP case. In other words, the formula of that that you cannot
reap where you have not sown is bound to be bandied about. And my
thought in mentioning the costs items was to say these are the constituof reaping
ent elements
Published
by eCommons,
1991 where you have not sown, and it is better if

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:2

counsel brings to the court the details of what they think is reaping
where you have not sown. Does that respond to your question?
MR. CUTLER: I guess as a litigator I would agree, but I wonder
what is socially good about protecting facts just because people have
spent a lot of time digging them up?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: You see, when you use the word facts,
you and I may have a difference of opinion. I am not sure what a fact
is. None of these words are self-defining. So in the census taker example in Feist, if the census taker were sent-assuming how the census is
taken; that is, they get a book, they have some blank forms-the census
taker goes to a jurisdiction populated by homeless people and that particular census taker decides he cannot count them, so they come up
with what we would call an algorithm and they use a sophisticated statistical formula and they come up with a version, and that version is a
number. Then that is not considered by the supervisor to be appropriate, so another census taker is sent out. Two different numbers appear.
What is a fact in that circumstance?
In other words, is there a point in time when you cannot divorce
the fact from the organizational compilational activity that produces
that piece of information? So you and I may differ in that you may
have an assumption that, well, I know a fact when I see one, and my
argument is in this kind of protection of intellectual property is the
underlying activity. That is what the word creativity meant in Feist,
and that is what authorship means in 102. There is conduct and there
is a product. Sometimes the two are easily distinguishable; sometimes
they are not. Sometimes you can only tell about the product from looking through it at the conduct.
Are we speaking to each other?
MR. CUTLER: What I do not understand again, at least in trying
to figure out what is socially good as opposed to what is a good argument in a lawsuit is the basic concept that the Constitution seems to be
falling down on the side of disclosure as opposed to protection, and
when you cannot separate the facts from the organizational skills, et
cetera, then it ought to be disclosed and freely available.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Who disclosed it in your hypothetical,
the person who took it or the person who provided it in the first instance? You can say that they both disclosed it.
MR. CUTLER: If the fact is published, there are in your example
a hundred people living in west Dayton, regardless of how they.figured
it out, anyone else ought to be able to talk about it.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I see different versions to what you
just said. If you say there are a hundred people in west Dayton, the
person who went and counted them certainly could talk about it. But
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
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could the person who wants to use that number say: "I am not going
down to west Dayton, that is a pain in the neck and it costs money,
here is so and so's piece of paper that has it and I am just going to
copy that, reproduce it, and replicate it for sale."
In some circumstances I am suggesting that could pose a problem
and a court may say, no, you cannot take the fact. The fact that it is a
fact, that it is a piece of information that is known and derived from
somebody's intellectual activity does not, without looking into the context of the circumstances, tell you who appropriately should be able to
disclose it. You can have the last word.
MR. CUTLER: No.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Have I run you over with words? I did
not intend to do that.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have some other people who want
to jump in.
MR. STEELE: Kurt Steele, Rand McNally. I believe one of the
problems with the Feist case is that, for better or for worse the Court
decided to take a case to resolve the conflict among the circuits that on
the surface had some very simple "facts," telephone listings. If the
court had instead waited for a more opportune case and dealt with
"facts" that had more expression clothing, maybe the rather simplistic,
almost black and white statements in their opinion would not have been
quite so strident. There would have been more sensitivity that not all
facts are the same as you are suggesting.
My question is how much of what we are talking about now is a
problem of deciding to what degree certain "facts" are clothed sufficiently to be protectible so adequate protection for many different types
of works could still be found post-Feist if the courts work hard enough
to do that, or are the courts more likely to very stringently apply Feist?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: You have asked me a lot of things. I
think to start with the last, I would say that that's what I meant when
I said we as group have the capability of filling that hole by what we
do.
Let's try to get as concrete as possible because you and I have
been talking on the abstract level. How about a map of south Florida in
which the map maker effectively described the rate of economic development, the rate of condominiums, trying to get a lot of factual information in here. It gets coalesced in the map, and in the two dimensional it is multi-colored and they use a whole variety of special
symbols that reflects underlying information about the rate of change,
how many new strip shopping centers there are, how many condominiums there are, and so on and so on. So, we have something concrete to
Published
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Now, at some point along comes one of your competitors and they
photocopy it or they reduce it and they sell it. And at some point I
think I would say to you the person who does that ought, under some
legal doctrine, not to be able to do that. Am I responding to what your
concern is?
MR. STEELE: I do not think there is any question about that
under the current law.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: So we change that. And the second
person, they may still photocopy it but then they add some material to
it. In a different shade, they may show the gross income of all the acquiring, how many shopping centers have been acquired, the shopping
centers on the first map that have been acquired, some financial data
by color and an attached legend of who bought them. Now what about
that one?
MR. STEELE: We are moving a little off.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I thought that is where you and I
were. Put me back on the track.
MR. STEELE: How would you respond to that? Is your second
example arguably protectible post-Feist?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: That is the beginning of where protection could begin. I cannot tell you whether it would be adding this
piece of information or that piece of information, but the person-that
I think is the ultimate object.
If you took the maps out of the picture and you have two essays
that described all the events that happened, most of us would say there
is narrow protection for facts and protection for copyright, and that
information, you and I would agree, ought to be disclosed in a sense.
And so at some point, I think the court would draw a line and that
is how they would go. They would say you have this second person who
has now contributed something material to this information and maybe
some of the information is widely available. It may be that in defense
the second person might point out that the map that had, you say it is a
Rand McNally map, but the U.S. Statistical Abstract had some of that
same information, and there is a doctoral piece somewhere that has
some of that information. And what you have is information that you
acquired at some cost and expense, but it is alternatively available from
other sources, and so on. So I think originality in the Feist sense really
does mean some kind of comparison to the patent concept of novelty. I
think courts have upheld it. Have I responded to what you asked?
MR. STEELE: This will be an interesting two days.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Are we both going to survive?
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
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MR. McDONALD: Jack McDonald, Dun & Bradstreet. In the
comments that we were just given it was suggested that what appears
to be a fact may not be a fact. And it was so implied that if you hold
something out as a fact and you publish that there are a hundred people in south Dayton, assuming there is a south Dayton, that by holding
that out somebody could pick it up and use it.
Is the problem then one of putting a disclaimer in front saying
that all data elements contained herein are the result of algorithms that
contain my selection, judgment, and other criteria that I have authored. I mean, do you add something to your copyright notice saying
that these are all approximations? Does that get you off the hook?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Well, my reaction to that would be
now you switched from copyright law to contract law and you are moving in the direction of shrink-wrap license and that is an alternative
means of protection. That is a perfectly viable lawyer's response to the
avoid the Feist decision. If you ask me should you do that, sure.
Look at the first screen that Mr. Schatz has authored in
WESTLAW. It tells you the things you can do and things you cannot
do, and it sounds like he has some of the things in there that you were
saying.
Mr. Schatz, do you agree with that?
MR. SCHATZ: We cannot agree with just everything.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: The legend that appears on
WESTLAW with respect to limitations, I assume you were responsible
for these.
MR. SCHATZ: I do not know. You will have to give me a basic
draft of the legends on these.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: And I take it, I interpreted your question to mean such a legend you would put on your own.
MR. McDONALD: I have never looked at his legend. I probably
ought to. I do not see how I am engaging in shrink-wrap. I am characterizing or providing information to disclosure as to the nature of the
material I am providing.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: But the legal consequences of that
would be you are inviting somebody by using that product to accept
that whole thing. I am saying it could be a contractual method of
protection.
THE CHAIRMAN: Jack [McDonald], are you also trying to suggest that such a legend would undercut an assertion that these things
really are facts, and by implication, therefore, they are expressive statements, that there are a hundred people in Dayton, but you are saying
Published
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fore you cannot copy it as a fact, and if you take that information, you
are taking my expression; is that what you are trying to say?
MR. McDONALD: Exactly.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think, that statement stays inside the copyright law.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Then you are laying a premise for a
court then to say, ah, those materials are not what we would call unprotected facts in this case.
There are two legal consequences to what you assert. One, it could
raise a contract right, and the other, it could be a predicate for a finding by a federal judge as a matter of law that this material is not fact.
Does that respond?
MR. McDONALD: Certainly down the road. I mean if somebody
were to copy my estimate that there are a hundred people in south
Dayton and I were to sue them for copyright infringements, down the
road, they would certainly have the opportunity to say I did not have
any authorship in developing that number, that I had used perfectly
mundane and routine, I guess garden variety might be a popular version these days, methods of deriving that number of one hundred. That
certainly is something that would be contested, but it is an off the bat
sort of thing.
In terms of giving notice of what you consider to be a fact, something that you consider to be factual and something that you consider
to be ultimately protectible within a compilation, do you have to-the
answer you gave to the other gentleman-give the reader or the user
some sort of notice?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I do not think scienter is an element of
this, but how you characterize the material might be probative and evidentiary of what kind of material it is. That is one evidentiary element
to which a court could look.
THE CHAIRMAN: Notice we have identified two separate
problems already. One is trying to figure out what things are factual.
The broader category is what things are in the public domain, whether
it is a federal court opinion published by Mead Data Central or West,
for example, or a fact, whatever that might be. But what things are in
the public domain and therefore freely takeable in those elements in
which they are public domain.
The second issue is when you assemble the whole bunch of these
public domain materials, factual materials, whatever they might be, to
what extent is the assemblage protectible as an assemblage in some
sense. I think we have two different questions on the table already.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: This question of protecting factual information is something I want to elaborate on in my talk tomorrow, but
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
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since it has come up in this context, I would like to makes a brief introductory comment.
What I think the problem is with an approach like Feist is that
you say facts are not copyrightable-period. You remove all ability
from the courts to balance. Yet, intellectual property law in general,
and copyright law in particular, is, in fact, a balance of a variety of
social policies and intentions.
And there are different kinds of facts. I think the question, "Is this
or is this not a fact?" is ultimately fruitless. The real question is, what
kinds of facts or factual information call for some protection; what
kinds of information really ought to be left for free and open debate?
And I think the examples of Wainwright, on the one hand, and this
census data, on the other, are good because both works take effort to
produce.
Let's say, you get the economic predictions of some particular
company's fortunes in Wainwright; you get, let's say, a very difficult
population to estimate in census data. Factual data or census data,
whether it is taken by the government or private people, may well be
matters of considerably more public interest than the sort of data in
Wainwright, which is certainly of interest to investors, but it is not the
kind of data that has to be immediately subject to free and open
debate.
The problem is that we need to draw a balance. We want to give
an incentive for people to go out and dig up these facts. I agree with
Leo [Raskind] completely about that, and I think the courts are going
to be very sensitive to that. They have in the past, and I see no reason
to think they are going to change. But that is only one factor.
We have another factor which is the free dissemination of information. However, I do not think we really want to say absolutely that
we do not have any protection for any factual information. There is a
balance. It is very sensitive; the protection should be very .limited, but
we should not ignore the production incentive completely.
The same thing goes for functionality-we must balance. We want
limited protection for functionality under copyright law because copyright goes on for too long and the remedies are too heavy-handed. We
want to be very careful about protecting functional works with copyright and we want to be very careful about overprotecting facts; there
is no question about that. But these interests must be balanced against
production incentives with respect to the kind of factual information
that we are talking about.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I think I agree with you completely.
Published
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becoming familiar with what I call mature copyright paradigm of the
Berne Convention because we have nothing like it.
We had what Barbara Rieger called a very primitive law and what
some authors have said, including myself, after the 1909 Act was little
more than what other countries would consider an industrial design
law. In effect eighty-five percent of all works only got twenty-eight
years of protection. Empirically, you had a very short term of protection in which it did not matter very much how subtle you became in
drawing the line between skilled efforts and creative, literary and artistic works because you did not have the true authors' right of law.
Then this country set about preparing for what would be our role
in the 1990s, and that is, bringing our law into line with the international copyright paradigm. Now, under the international copyright paradigm, you do not have low originality standards even though the myth
is that you do. On the contrary, you have quite a surprisingly high
standard in which most of the domestic foreign laws actually use the
term novel. They do not mean novel in the effective sense, they do not
mean objective novel. They mean something called subjective novel.
But the standard, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany is a personal, intellectual creation. That can be a fairly stiff standard. What is happening is that their surprisingly stiff standards are
coming down and as the only other country that has had as low a standard as the United Kingdom, ours are moving up towards the Berne
paradigm.
So the problem is that we are talking about a law that gives seventy-five to one hundred years of protection, not because it is there to
protect technology and not because it is there to stimulate investment
in computerized databases, but because the sons and daughters and
grandchildren of Verdi should not have to go hungry or because the
author Stuns Lonnigan should not have to go around with a begging
bone in his hand in his own lifetime while the publishers are making
money off his books, which is exactly what happened with the 1909
Act.
And, therefore you are entirely right, the question is misphrased if
we are saying we are going to use this big powerful, terribly powerful,
paradigm to protect stuff that needs to have a much more delicate balance between investment and users and competition, and at the same
time incentive. So we are using a cannon where a pistol would do. And
I think if we get that message from the Supreme Court's case, we can
move on to developing some very interesting and important protective
tools for the twenty-first century that would give a much lower, much
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
more interesting form of protection for a whole lot of things that I call

1992]

OPEN DISCUSSION

legal hybrids that do not fall or fit very well between either the patent
or the copyright paradigm.
MR. CLARK: Rob Clark with NCR Corporation. One of the
burning issues we have in our business is the extent to which copyright
law might be used in order to prevent computers and other machines
from using a common language so they would be unable to talk with
one another or work together and be compatible with other products in
the marketplace.
By way of hypothetical, if someone were to expend a lot of time,
money, and a great deal of creativity in conceiving a new language and
then commence to write a book, either written in such a language or
describing such a language. I guess, I am wondering about the extent
to which the copyright law should affect people's ability to write other
books either using the same language or other books written differently
to describe that.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: That is not an easy question and it
would get you back to the old game, thinking about the code book
cases which I am sure you have consulted. When you get the language
you are dealing with the kind of information that is so central to the
transmission of intellectual activity, that it is sort of like typefaces,
then I think you have a different set of issues to balance. So I think a
language is a very difficult thing for which to claim copyright protection although there is some old authority to suggest that. Is that a responsive answer to your question?
MR. CLARK: I think to the extent that our company embraced
open systems strategies, we are of the opinion that the law should not
protect such language.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I think the law we are dealing with at
the moment really would not protect it. Have you seen Richard Stern's
piece on that?
MR. CLARK: No, I have not.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: He has given a lot of thought to it. It
is a nice piece. He concludes the same. It is like typeface. Language is
central to the transmission of electronic activity; it would not be a
good, socially desirable thing to allow somebody to use that, especially
if that is an efficient means of making those machines.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: John Odozynski. I just want to ask Professor
Raskind a follow-up to that. I think everyone could agree a common
language would be an important media for artificial transmission of
intellectual property. But why, by virtue of the straightforward application of either copyright or patent law, would it not be protectible because I can see it would clearly be under either copyright or patent
Published
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would be easily protectible in any number of ways on any number of
levels.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I do not agree with you about the last
part. I think with the patent part you would have trouble because these
languages all have a commonality to them, with substantial variations,
and I think the doctrine of equivalence would make any claim-I
mean, you could try to write the claim that this language is different,
but. So reasonable people could differ about that. That would be one
reaction.
And the other reaction is with typefaces. Look at the problems
that there have been with typefaces, and typefaces are a constituent
element of just what you seek to protect. So in those circumstances
there is an activity that results in a physical product, which would be
on the side of Feist. You could use Feist's analysis to say it is outside
the scope.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: Well, it seems to me it depends upon what
he was talking about, whether he was talking about a common language in the abstract. It seems to me there could be aspects of a common software language that clearly would have commonality to things
that occurred before, a prior art, but that, as a development of that
language, there would be an invention made or a number of inventions
made that might very well be patentable, that might very well be the
aspect of a common language that would render it most desirable. And
similarly if the writing and reducing of the ideas that represent that
common language, in reducing that to code, I wonder why there would
not be reflected some creativity that would render that code
copyrightable.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: You just said that. Of course, you
could say that of it, but in the end if that were-in what context would
you want to protect it. In other words, let's look it that way.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: I would want to protect it every context I
could.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: But there is what is called fair use,
isn't there? So then someone could come along and say I used your
language because this particular device that I have to meter some medical instrument will use the computer to do that, and it is an improvement. In some circumstances the court might find that you are not using that in medical field and this is an adaptation of your language and
107 would say that. So I think if you're looking for a blanket statement
about language because there is cost and effort into it, I do not think
you could make that claim.
MR. ROMANOW: Joe Romanow from GTE. Getting back to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
Feist, Professor Raskind, you suggested that Feist might well be lim-
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ited to the very special facts of the case. On the other hand, you also
suggested a statute outside of copyright law that would protect
databases. I do not want to draw the wrong inference.
There seems to me there is a lot of room for negotiation still in
protecting databases that might have a modicum of creativity in them.
Are you suggesting that computer databases will come under the sweep
of the Feist case?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: If you mean come under the sweep, do
I think there will be a case where someone has downloaded. Let's be as
specific as possible. Yes, I think there will be case where someone will
download from electronic database, make a few changes, as I said with
regard to the map of south Florida, and market another product, and
then the issue will be joined. So, yes, I think there is likely to come up
such an instance.
Do I think-who will win in those circumstances? As I said to
Dennis [Karjala], there certainly will be, and it is a rational response
by lawyers who represent industry who have databases to try state law,
to try the state statute, a process where state statutes will be enacted.
Then the issue of preemptions, about which Dennis [Karjala] and I
may or may not agree, will then arise, and so reach over in the next
dozen years. Am I responding to you?
MR. ROMANOW: I guess the major thrust of my question is, is
there still room for a good deal of originality even in factual databases
notwithstanding the Feist case?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I think I would say yes, and I think it
comes out like this because the word "original" both in the opinion and
in the statute focuses on the product and when you say authorship that
focuses on the company. So let's be as specific as possible.
Suppose I went to a software manufacturer at NCR who came out
with a fancy software package and would make it available, even with
regard to the Feist case. If I could keyboard it in, I could get the previous records; I would get the geographic data of all the counties in Kansas that were involved, and I might get the names of all the people; in
other words, aggregate a whole bunch of information in various bits
and pieces. Now for some reason I do not have the opinion, so I go out
and gather that material and I buy the software package. But then I go
to LEXIS and WESTLAW, and I just download the cases. So I take
all of their case law material, but I have surrounded it with a bunch of
different material.
I think that that is the kind of hypothetical. Did that respond to
what you have in mind? How should that come out, I think that is the
question. At what point should the court say, okay, you have done
Published
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and you have not done anything. All that stuff is available. I think
those are the issues and how they get framed. Does that respond to
your question?
MR. ROMANOW: Yes.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Just a small point on the LEXIS question. Downloading the LEXIS database has always been a favorite example of mine, even long before Feist. I do not think we are talking
about facts. What we have in the LEXIS database are literary works
that happen to be in the public domain for various policy reasons. But
we are not downloading facts. So I do not think there is any question in
this case that a state misappropriation protection of this activity has to
be preempted.
So now you really are stuck, and I think Feist is pretty clear that
this kind of a database is not protected. There is no selection in what is
in the database because every single case is there. There is no arrangement, essentially by definition, in a database, or if there is any arrangement, you are not taking it because you are simply taking the case one
by one. If Feist is correct, that is the end of legal protection for those
kinds of works. I think that is wrong, but I think that is the result.
That's pretty clear.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I think the thrust of the question
was that it may not be so clear and if Leo [Raskind] would agree that
it is not so clear you can copyright such matter, I would agree with
him. I think Eckes is the key: no one should underestimate the importance of the Second Circuit's Eckes decision. "Selection and arrangement" is not a very exacting standard as our courts have interpreted it,
because the usual test is to ask if there was any room for choice. How
was there in Eckes? Plaintiffs could show they had left out a whole
bunch of cards that were possible to include, and they took a whole
bunch of other baseball cards for certain reasons, and that was it. Indeed, I think we have another baseball-related decision after Eckes, in
which the court applied the Eckes rationale to pitching forms, again in
the Second Circuit.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: The Chinese telephone directory.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Maybe, but there is still another
case. In any event, that is what I meant by Eckes plus or minus a
"tad." It may even be a little less than Eckes and a little bit more than
F.I.I. v. Moody, I would suspect.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: What about LEXIS? What about
that?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I agree with you. I do not think that
is all important because, with LEXIS, you are dealing with literary
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/5
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PROFESSOR KARJALA: But there is no selection or arrangement; that is the point.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I think it will often be possible to
manufacture claims of selection and arrangement. I think Leo [Raskind] is right. I think before he surrenders to misappropriation law, I
think he should consider that, to the extent the appropriation is slavish,
the courts are going to lean over backwards to find a modicum of arrangement and selection, anyway. They are going to grab onto that
language in Feist and say, we know the threshold is very low, even if it
has to be drawn somewhere, and that is not a very exacting standard
for selection and arrangement.
One thing Feist will eliminate is the tendency of prior courts to
say that a defendant's slavish imitation could retroactively make plaintiff's contribution more "original." This was always result-oriented
bunkum, and Professors Patterson and Joyce poke fun at it in their
wonderful article. So, after Feist, if a plaintiff really cannot show any
basis of selection and arrangement, then he is in trouble where he
might not have been before, even in the presence of slavish imitation.
Apart from this, however, I would wait a while before I gave up on the
games of selection and arrangement that we are going to play.
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